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Separation of Powers Under the Texas
Constitution
Harold H. Bruff*
The constitutional law of Texas, mirroring the state's history, is
rich, unique, and sometimes perplexing. A strong separation-of-powers
tradition is a prominent feature of this law. In both the state and the
federal contexts, everyone favors separation of powers as an abstract
principle, but few understand its application to modem government. In
particular, the "fourth branch" of government-administrative agen-
cies-rests uncomfortably in the classical tripartite scheme.1 Texas
courts, like those elsewhere, have struggled with separation-of-powers is-
sues and have produced a body of case law that resists confident applica-
tion to new controversies.
This Paper has two principal purposes. Part I examines general sep-
aration-of-powers jurisprudence in Texas and suggests an approach our
courts should follow in addressing these issues. My goal is to explore
competing approaches to recurring problems rather than to canvass the
cases comprehensively. Part II reviews one important deficiency in
Texas law limiting the availability of judicial review of administrative
action and suggests a cure based on separation-of-powers principles.
Throughout the Paper, I draw on recent controversies about separation
of powers at the federal level. They provide guidance for evaluating the
somewhat different problems at the state government level.
* John S. Redditt Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law. B.A. 1965,
Williams College; J.D. 1968, Harvard University.
1. See e.g., Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36
AM. U.L. REv. 277, 278 (1987) (observing that the transfer of legislative and judicial functions to
administrative agencies has led to "what many feel is a de facto fourth branch").
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I. Context: The Constitution and the Government of Texas
A. The Nature of the Texas Constitution
The constitution and government of Texas differ from those of the
United States in ways that are common to many states, especially in the
South.2 In part, the differences are attributable to a change in the cli-
mate of opinion about government between 1789 and 1876. The federal
constitution is a product of the Enlightenment.3 It manifests a qualified
optimism about the power of government to improve society-as long as
separation-of-powers provisions provide elemental controls on the ambi-
tions of individuals. The powers delegated to all three branches of the
federal government can grow to meet future needs. Congressional enu-
merated powers can expand through the "necessary and proper" clause.4
The President received the vague grants of power upon which the elabo-
rate edifice of the modem Presidency eventually has come to rest.5 The
uncertain scope of article III combined with the security of life tenure
has allowed the federal judiciary to assume a surprisingly central role in
the life of our democracy. 6 Indeed, so flexible are the constitutional de-
lineations of the relationships among the branches of government that
they have been amended only slightly over two centuries of vast growth
and change in the national government.
7
By 1876, however, disillusionment reigned. In the aptly named
Gilded Age, corruption soiled government at all levels.8 The Grant Ad-
ministration's scandals set the tone for much of American government.
Giveaways to special interests (especially the railroads) were widespread.
2. See generally C. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SouTH 1877-1913, at 65-66 (1951)
(discussing the history of the New South); J. Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870s: A
Case Study of Texas passim (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University) (available at
Tarlton Library, University of Texas School of Law) (discussing the origins and contents of the
Alabama, Texas, and Louisiana Constitutions).
3. See, eg., G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 268 (1981) (describing
Madison's world as "the world of the American Enlightenment-a world ... of optimism about
man's effort to order society rationally").
4. They have. See, eg., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 353 (1819) (allowing
Congress to establish a bank because the Constitution expressly gives Congress the power "to make
laws which shall be necessary and proper").
5. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 3-29 (1988).
6. This role stems, of course, from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), which
asserted the judicial power to adjudicate the constitutionality of statutes. Id. at 177. It was not long
before the visiting de Tocqueville could make his celebrated observations about the tendency of
Americans to convert public issues to legal controversies. See 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 330 (H. Reeve trans. 1961).
7. Although the Bill of Rights and a number of later amendments have affected national pow-
ers (for example, the sixteenth amendment authorized the income tax), few have altered the relation-
ship among the branches. The principal exceptions are four amendments affecting presidential
election, succession, and disability. See U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XX, XXII, XXV.




One wag remarked that the Standard Oil Company could do whatever it
wanted with the Pennsylvania Legislature "except refine it."
Meanwhile, the states of the former Confederacy boiled with resent-
ment towards the Reconstruction governments. Texans suffered under a
corrupt and autocratic regime that featured a carpetbag legislature, a de-
spised governor, and his appointed judges.9 When the opportunity ar-
rived to form "restoration" governments in the South, broad charters
with ringing empowerments were not in the offing. Instead, both struc-
tural and substantive limitations shackled the new state governments. In
Texas, a convention dominated by agrarian reformers of the Grange
sought all possible means to forestall oppressive, corrupt, and expensive
government. 10 It confined the legislature to short biennial sessions and
limited its power to tax and spend. 1 The convention fragmented the
executive branch by providing for a weak governor and separate elections
of several officers.12 In addition, the convention sought to tie the courts
to the popular will through short elective terms for judges.
13
Compared to its federal counterpart, the Texas Constitution is long,
specific, and confining. 14 Designed for a largely rural, agrarian state
with less than a million inhabitants and no oil industry, 15 the Texas Con-
stitution has endured to govern our largely urban and industrialized state
only because it is relatively easy to amend.1 6 Although encrusted with
326 amendments, the Texas Constitution retains its underlying nature.
9. See T. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR 433-42 (1968); S. McKAY, SEVEN DECADES OF THE
TEXAS CONSTITUTION OF 1876, at 23-46 (1942).
10. For a good historical review, see Thomas & Thomas, The Texas Constitution of 1876, 35
TEXAS L. REV. 907, 907-18 (1957). This article asserts that the majority of the delegates were
farmers who were "honest" and "industrious" believers in a "wise and frugal government." Id. at
907. The Grange was a national association whose purpose was to organize farmers into state and
local chapters to combat the widespread political corruption and improve the social and cultural
opportunities for farmers. See id. at 909. About half of the delegates to the Texas Constitutional
Convention were Grangers. See id.
11. See id. at 914-16 (noting that, to reduce the cost of government, the delegates limited legis-
lative salaries, discouraged long sessions, and limited the taxation power).
12. See id. at 914 (noting that "[t]he convention was determined to cut down on the governor's
power to prevent a future renewal of executive despotic control").
13. See id. at 916 (noting that the 1876 Constitution provided that judges be elected by popular
vote for 2-6 year terms in response to criticisms directed to the judiciary under the Reconstruction
government).
14. The Texas Constitution contains over 60,000 words and is six times as long as the U.S.
Constitution. See J. MAY, S. MACCORKLE & D. SMITH, TEXAS GOVERNMENT 43 (8th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter J. M4Y].
15. See id. at 38.
16. To amend the Texas Constitution, the amendment must be proposed by a joint resolution of
the legislature, must receive a two-thirds vote in each house, and must carry a simple majority of the
voters at an election. See TEX. CONST. art. XVII.
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B. The Separation-of-Powers Requirement
Like most states-but unlike the federal government-Texas has an
explicit constitutional provision mandating the separation of powers.
Article II, section 1 is phrased strongly:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be di-
vided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be con-
fided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are
Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those
which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of per-
sons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power
properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances
herein expressly permitted.
17
This provision has an excellent pedigree. The 1836 Constitution of the
Republic of Texas contained a shorter statement of the same principle:
"[t]he powers of this government shall be divided into three departments,
viz: legislative, executive, and judicial, which shall remain forever sepa-
rate and distinct." I s The first state constitution in 1845 adopted the
present version of the text. 19 Its terminology closely tracked the Louisi-
ana and Kentucky Constitutions that served as general models for
Texas. 20
Three potential sources for the original inclusion of a separation-of-
powers provision existed in 1836. First, the basic structure of the federal
constitution and the Federalist Papers embraced separation-of-powers
principles. 21 Second, a number of existing state constitutions provided
model provisions. In hurriedly drafting its constitution, Texas borrowed
eclectically from both federal and state constitutions. 22 Several of the
then-existing state separation-of-powers provisions antedated the federal
constitution and were phrased similarly to the one Texas adopted in
1836.23 Finally, the Constitutions of both Mexico and the State of Coa-
huila and Texas contained language similar to that adopted by Texas in
17. Id. art. II, § 1.
18. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1836).
19. See TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).
20. See Paxson, The Constitution of Texas, 1845, at 18 Sw. HIsT. Q. 386, 388 (1915). For the
text of these cognate provisions, see 3 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTrruTIONS AND ORGANIC
LAWS 1492-1908, at 1277 (R. Thorpe ed. 1909) (Kentucky); id. at 1392 (Louisiana).
21. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 59-66.
22. See Richardson, Framing the Constitution of the Republic of Texas, 31 Sw. HIST. Q. 191,
209 (1928).
23. Indeed, in 1836 Texans needed to look no further than The Federalist No. 47, which
Madison devoted to answering charges that the proposed constitution violated "the political maxim
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct," THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), and in which he quoted various





The general desirability of requiring separation of powers in state
government was not controversial at the time Texas won its indepen-
dence or at the important moments of constitution-making in 1836, 1845,
and 1876.25 Nor, I presume, would it be controversial today. But it is
one thing to favor the separation of powers as a guiding precept and
another to apply it to the complex operations of a modern state govern-
ment. Here, difficulty and controversy intrude.
II. Modes of Interpreting Separation-of-Powers Provisions
A. Competing Interpretive Approaches
The separation of powers serves two principal purposes. First, it
attempts to prevent excessive concentration of power in the hands of any
particular officer who might then act arbitrarily.26 Second, it promotes
effective government by assigning functions to the branches of govern-
ment that are institutionally best suited to discharge them.27 The basic
methods of implementing these goals are common to federal and state
constitutions. Separately constituted governmental bodies are assigned
certain defined powers; checks and balances provide the branches some
24. The 1827 Constitution of the State of Coahuila and Texas provided in article 29: "The
supreme powers of the state shall be divided for its exercise into legislative, executive and judicial,
and neither these three powers, or any two of the same, shall ever be united in one corporation or
person, nor shall the legislative be deposited in one individual alone." 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAs 426 (1898). There was a similar provision in title II, article 6 of the Mexican Constitution of
1824. See id. at 73. The Texans adopted some aspects of their Spanish and Mexican law heritage,
especially those concerning land distribution and tenure. See Ashford, Jacksonian Liberalism and
Spanish Law in Early Texas, 57 Sw. HIsT. Q. 1, 1 (1953). The extent to which they also drew their
separation-of-powers provision from this source is unknown.
25. Constitutional histories of these periods discuss many controversial matters, but mention
separation-of-powers provisions only in passing, if at all. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 22, at
199-204 (discussing the 1836 Constitution); Paxson, supra note 20, at 392-93 (discussing the 1845
Constitution); Thomas & Thomas, supra note 10, at 913 (discussing the 1876 Constitution).
26. The classic statement is Madison's quote from Montesquieu in The Federalist No. 47:
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says
he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or
senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again:
"Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it
joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (quoting MoNTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book XI, ch. 6).
27. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government. Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 602 (1984). For example, the framers gave the President broad
responsibility for conducting war and foreign policy because the executive is able to act with "energy
and dispatch." Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REv.
491, 508 (1987). Similarly, they gave the House of Representatives the power to originate revenue
measures because its short terms keep it close to the people. See Barber, Judicial Review and the
Federalists, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 836, 851 (1988); Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial
Selections: A View from The Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669, 1680 (1988).
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power to participate in one another's decisions as a means of self-defense
and overall control. Examples of checks and balances include the execu-
tive's veto of legislation and the legislature's power to advise and consent
to executive nominations.
The United States Supreme Court has decided many important sep-
aration-of-powers cases over the years. Its decisions have oscillated be-
tween two principal interpretive approaches. 28 One approach, called
formalism, develops from the constitutional text and the framers' ac-
knowledged purpose to create three independent branches with distinct
functions. Formalist decisions tend to draw bright lines between the re-
sponsibilities of the branches.29 The competing approach is a "func-
tional" one. Functionalism assesses each branch's need to protect its
core constitutional functions from attempts by other branches to aggran-
dize themselves. 30 Functional decisions stress the inclusion of checks
and balances, making shared powers ali integral part of the overall strat-
egy of controlling government.31 Functional analysis, therefore, favors
complex arrangements that blend the powers of the branches, while for-
malism promotes distinct divisions. 32 The Supreme Court's rationale for
choosing one approach over the other in a particular case, although sub-
28. Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983) (using a formalist approach to sepa-
ration of powers to preserve three distinct branches of government) with United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (using a functional approach that stresses flexibility). See generally Bruff, supra
note 27, at 495-506 (discussing several Supreme Court separation-of-powers cases).
29. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (invalidating the Comptroller Gen-
eral's power to shape budget deficit reduction plans); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954-55 (invalidating Con-
gress's retention of power to reverse decisions that Congress had authorized the Attorney General to
make).
30. See, eg., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (holding that Congress's restric-
tion of the Attorney General's power to remove independent counsel did not impermissibly infringe
upon executive authority, because the President's control over counsel is not essential to the func-
tioning of the executive branch); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-
57 (1986) (stating that the placement of adjudicative authority in an agency raised no question of
aggrandizement of congressional power).
31. Another passage in The Federalist No. 47 is illustrative. Madison emphasizes that Montes-
quieu's broad statements about the need for separated power
did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over,
the acts of each other. His meaning... can amount to no more than this, that where the
whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted.
THE FEDERALISt No. 47, at 302-03 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that the Constitu-
tion contemplates the integration of diffused powers into a workable government, giving the
branches "separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity").
32. See Bruff, supra note 27, at 503 (noting that the functional approach allows a diverse gov-
ernment). See generally Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions--4 Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 493 (1987) (suggesting that a functional
approach can be reconciled with the wording of the Constitution).
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ject to scholarly speculation, 33 is ultimately obscure-perhaps even to the
Justices. General separation-of-powers principles invite these two ap-
proaches; therefore, they also appear in state constitutional law. Because
separation-of-powers scholarship has explored thoroughly the implica-
tions of these approaches in the federal context, and because state consti-
tutional law often draws on federal analogues, I begin with the Supreme
Court's experience.
Throughout the analysis, it will be necessary to note the disparities
in structure and function of state and federal constitutions and govern-
ments; these disparities may suggest differences in legal approach and
outcome.
B. The Place of Agencies in Government
It is often said (because it is easy to say) that the legislature enacts
laws, the executive enforces them, and the judiciary construes them.34
This truism does not, however, set precise limits to the organization of
government. The reality is that both federal and state agencies routinely
perform functions characteristic of each of the traditional branches of
government. For example, an agency such as the Federal Trade Coin-'
mission or the Texas Railroad Commission promulgates regulations hav-
ing the force of law, decides whom to prosecute for violating them, and
adjudicates the issue of guilt or innocence.3 5 This combination of func-
tions has long been considered indispensable to effective administration,
but it bedevils separation-of-powers analysis and raises basic issues of
fairness.
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that this com-
bination of fumctions may produce unacceptable dangers of bias in partic-
ular circumstances, 36 the Court has upheld this combination against due
33. See Bruff, supra note 27, at 495-506; Strauss, supra note 32, at 488-90.
34. In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall remarked:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the
executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may
commit something to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of
this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter
unnecessarily.
Id. at 46. Unfortunately, the first part of Marshall's analysis is often quoted or paraphrased without
the second. See, eg., I THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAs: AN ANNOTATED AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 90 (G. Braden ed. 1977) [hereinafter ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION] (para-
phrasing the first part of the sentence without attribution).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) (giving the FTC the power to police unfair competition); TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6446, 6461 (Vernon 1926) (giving the Texas Railroad Commission the
power to police railroad abuses).
36. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973) (holding that a state licensing board




process challenges on the basis of fairness.37 The Court has recognized
three kinds of statutory protections that promote fairness and that char-
acterize state and federal administrative procedure statutes such as the
Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA).38  First,
statutes require procedural safeguards for agency rulemaking, investiga-
tion, and adjudication. 39 In Texas, for example, agencies must adjudicate
on the basis of a record compiled according to rules of evidence and ex-
plain the results by making findings.4° Second, statutes require "separa-
tion of functions"-structural separations between investigators and
adjudicators within the agency that aid neutral decisions.41 Finally, stat-
utes define the scope of judicial review of agency action to provide a
meaningful check on an agency's fidelity to law.
42
These methods of assuring the fairness and legality of agency actions
have important separation-of-powers implications. Agencies, often aptly
,called the fourth branch of government, draw their legitimacy from their
relationships with the three constitutional branches and the people. 43
The legislature controls agencies through substantive and procedural
statutes and appropriations, the executive appoints their members (or the
people elect them), and the judiciary reviews their decisions to assure
compliance with statutory and constitutional commands.
The delegation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions to
37. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975) (upholding the power of a state board
of medical examiners to adjudicate charges against a doctor whom it had investigated).
38. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1990).
39. See id. § 5 (rulemaking), §§ 14, 14a (investigation), §§ 13-18 (adjudication of contested
cases). The Supreme Court has upheld federal statutes with similar restrictions. See Withrow, 421
U.S. at 38 (upholding a statute that contained certain due process guarantees, such as limiting the
board's authority to impose a temporary suspension and find probable cause, and requiring resort to
the courts to revoke a license or to make a criminal charge).
40. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, §§ 14(a), 16 (a,b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
41. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act has a well-developed set of such restrictions.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988),(providing that the employee who presides over the adjudicative
function may not have been involved in the investigative or prosecutorial functions of the agency in
that or a factually similar case). The Supreme Court has approved of the principle of "separation of
functions" in agency actions, but not of a rigid application of this principle. See Withrow, 421 U.S.
at 51 (explaining that, depending upon the particular situation, due process may require that distinc-
tive administrative functions be performed by different persons). But see id. at 52 (finding "no sup-
port for the bald proposition . . . that agency members who participate in an investigation are
disqualified from adjudicating"). See generally Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of
Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1981) (noting
variables such as the formality of the adjudication and the personal involvement of the agency staff
member that make it difficult to generalize about an agency's separation of functions). APTRA,
however, has only limited restrictions on ex parte contacts between agency adjudicators and staff
members who have participated in the case. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 17
(Vernon Supp. 1990).
42. See, eg., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (giving the
state district court the power of de novo or appellate review, depending on the type of case and the
statute under which review is sought).




agencies, combined with checks on agency authority, offers a compro-
mise between the goals of administrative efficiency and the separation of
powers. To insist that only the legislature make law, only the executive
implement statutes, and only the courts adjudicate controversies would
destroy modern government. It also would pose insuperable practical
and theoretical difficulties. On the practical side, the ability of a legisla-
ture to consider public issues is limited by the legislature's size and ca-
pacity--even without the meeting restrictions that JTexas imposes. 44
Moreover, generalist legislators cannot develop, as much expertise in par-
ticular matters as agencies can.45 It would not be feasible for the legisla-
ture to enact and continually update the entire Administrative Code as
statutes. While the legislature could expand the jurisdiction of Texas
courts to handle all the formal adjudication now performed by agencies,
doing so would strain an already large and busy state judiciary and for-
feit the benefits of agency expertise.46 Furthermore, state courts could
not perform all of the informal adjudications that agencies perform.47
Attempts to classify agency functions as legislative, executive, or ju-
dicial encounter theoretical problems because the three classic powers
overlap. The application of law to fact, for example, is both a judicial
and an executive function.48 A judge's decision whether particular facts
constitute a statutory violation requires construing the law and is clearly
adjudicative. Yet this decision is ordinarily preceded by a similar execu-
tive judgment that the actions in question occurred, violated the statute,
and warranted enforcement.49 Similarly, policy making is both legisla-
tive and executive in nature. All agencies have general policies that func-
tionally resemble legislation: "We don't prosecute first-time offenders
for trace amounts of that substance." Such informal policy making in-
heres in government. Indeed, a clear statement of informal agency policy
often advances good government even if the policy is not clearly author-
ized by statute.
44. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 5 (providing for biennial legislative sessions and specifying the
business to be conducted during each period of a session).
45. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN, & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 11 (2d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter G. ROBINSON].
46. See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes
of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 355, 382 (1987).
47. See G. ROBINSON, supra note 45, at 12.
48. The Supreme Court has compounded this confusion by remarking that "[i]nterpreting a law
... to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law." Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). Yet this also describes much of what the courts do. See id. at 748-
53 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 3-233 (1969) (reviewing kinds of disposi-
tive discretionary decisions made by bureaucrats in the field, such as police officers).
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C. Separation-of-Powers Implications of the Structure of Texas
Government
If simple characterization of functions cannot settle separation-of-
powers questions, then the strength and nature of the relationships be-
tween agencies and the constitutional branches take on paramount im-
portance.50 Because the structure of government establishes the
parameters for these relationships, the differences between federal and
state governments may prove important to the analysis. 51 The structure
of Texas government permits the ties between a particular agency and
each of the three branches of the state government to be weaker-some-
times far weaker-than they would be in the federal government.
5 2
Given this distance, fundamental questions arise about an agency's ac-
countability to the people.
The Texas Legislature is in session far less often than Congress. 5
3
This hampers its consideration of changes in the statutes governing the
agencies. Additionally, Texas legislative committees and their staffs ex-
ercise less vigilant informal oversight of the agencies than their federal
counterparts do.54 On the other hand, the Sunset Act forces the Texas
Legislature to revisit our vast sprawl of agency authorities periodically
for revision or possible termination. 55 Consequently, Texas has said
goodbye to the Pink Bollworm Commission and the Stonewall Jackson
Memorial Board but not to the Board of Podiatry Examiners.
5 6
50. See Strauss, supra note 27, at 641.
51. Many of these differences are characteristic of most state governments and are not unique
to Texas. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'TAL RELATIONS, STATE COURTS
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: SELECTED ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE INITIATIVES 4-5
(1989) (recommending the "[r]ebalancing of responsibilities in the federal system.., to give state
and local governments greater authority to serve the needs of their citizens"); U.S. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOV'TAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY
20-24 (1985) (discussing states' contemporary roles in the federal system); see also COUNCIL OF
STATE GOV'T, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1988-89, at 6-7 (1988) (discussing new constitutional
changes in various states that affect the relationship between the three branches of government).
52. See J. MAY, supra note 14, at 207 (noting that "[a] major characteristic of Texas adminis-
tration is the general absence of overall or central managerial control and supervision"). Most fed-
eral agencies are subject to close oversight from all three branches of government. For an overview,
see Brnff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 207, 227-44 (1984).
53. Compare TEX. CONST. art. III, § 5 (providing for biennial 120-day sessions of the Texas
Legislature) with U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (requiring Congress to assemble at least once in every
year). Other state legislatures share the characteristics described in this paragraph. See Rosenthal,
The State of State Legislatures: An Overview, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1185, 1187-1204 (1983).
54. See J. MAY, supra note 14, at 167. Both legislators and their staffs are part-time; frequent
hiring for the "session only" guarantees high staff turnover and makes effective oversight during
intersessions difficult.
55. See TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 325.001-325.024 (Vernon 1988).
56. See TEX. SUNSET ADVISORY COMM'N, SUNSET REVIEW IN TEXAS: SUMMARY OF PRO-
CESS AND PROCEDURE 7, 9 (1985). The Pink Bollworm Commission set up pink bollworm control
areas to regulate cotton growing in certain parts of the state where it deemed control necessary.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GUIDE TO TEXAS STATE AGENCIES 137 (5th
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The long ballot assures the weakness of the Texas governor by pro-
viding for the separate election of such important state officials as the
lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the comptroller, the treasurer,
and the land commissioner.57 For separation-of-powers purposes, how-
ever, the long ballot is an advantage. Direct election of administrators
ensures their accountability to the people. In contrast, the appointment
of administrators creates separation-of-powers problems. The governor
appoints over two thousand officers to a vast array of state agencies.58
The accountability of appointed administrators is always indirect; in
Texas, fragmentation of the executive further attenuates any accountabil-
ity. Texas has about two hundred administrative agencies,5 9 which vary
widely both in size and professionalism. The governor can remove of-
ficers that he appoints only with the advice and consent of the Senate. 60
The governor does have some budgeting powers, but they provide little
opportunity for disciplining the agencies because the Legislative Budget
Board's budget dominates the agenda in practice. 61 The governor also
has the constitutional power to assure the faithful execution of the
laws, 62 but Texas governors have never used it as a basis for vigorous
oversight of the agencies.
63
Texas courts' review of agency action varies from de novo review to
no review at all.64 The absence of review is especially troubling-judicial
review assumes special importance when both legislative and executive
oversight are attenuated. Absent effective judicial review, an agency may
be accountable to no one but itself. This condition subverts a central
ed. 1978) [hereinafter LBJ SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS]. The Stonewall Jackson Memorial Board
operated the Stonewall Jackson Memorial Fund and used the fund's interest to conduct essay con-
tests and to grant scholarships. See id. at 173.
57. See J. MAY, supra note 14, at 212-13 (noting that a component of the strong executive
model is a short ballot with the governor, or at most the governor, lieutenant governor, and the
attorney general as the only elected officers).
58. See 1 TEX. RESEARCH LEAGUE, STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION IN TEXAs: DE-
SIGNING THE BLUEPRINT 33 (1975).
59. The number depends on what is counted as an agency; institutions of higher education, for
example, are sometimes omitted. See id. at 31-32 & app. A (listing 179 administrative departments,
but omitting courts, the legislature, and institutions of higher education); LBJ SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at v (noting that the edition contains a listing of 242 agencies).
60. See TEX. CONST. art. XV, § 9.
61. See J. MAY, supra note 14, at 183-84. The governor and the Legislative Budget Board now
share power to effect some emergency rescissions of funds appropriated to agencies. See TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 317.001-317.012 (Vernon 1988).
62. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
63. See 1 ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, supra note 34, at 319.
64. Compare Bishop v. Martin, 740 S.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (requiring de novo review for the revocation of a day care license) with Firemen's & Police-
men's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Blanchard, 582 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. 1979) (holding that disciplinary
suspensions of police officers are nonreviewable).
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purpose of the separation of powers-preventing unchecked concentra-
tions of governmental power.
D. Basic Separation-of-Powers Doctrine in Texas
The explicit separation-of-powers provision in Texas has affected
the state's law to some extent, not always for the better. For the most
part, Texas's separation-of-powers doctrine appears to flow not from the
text of article II, section 1, but from principles and realities of govern-
ment that are largely the same for the federal government, which lacks
such a provision. Nevertheless, the prominence of Texas's constitutional
command has given the separation-of-powers doctrine a special vigor in a
number of respects. As I will demonstrate, while some Texas cases ap-
pear to have invoked the doctrine in support of purposes unrelated to the
constitutional mandate, some of the doctrine's applications undoubtedly
pay simple tribute to the power of parchment.
The initial premise of Texas's separation-of-powers doctrine is com-
mon to state governments-the legislature's power is plenary (not dele-
gated as in the federal government), subject only to limits found in the
state or federal constitution. 65 Of course, in a state like Texas, the legis-
lature's "plenary" powers may be more apparent than real because of a
proliferation of explicit constitutional restrictions.6 6 Nonetheless, the
premise aids much ordinary legislation because no enumerated powers
need be invoked.
Although the other branches enjoy no plenary-powers doctrine,
courts often read affirmative grants of power to the executive and judicial
branches broadly enough to make the distinction largely meaningless.
For example, Texas courts claim broad "inherent" and "implied" au-
thority. In Eichelberger v. Eichelberger,67 the Texas Supreme Court de-
cided that it could reverse an appellate judgment over which it had no
statutory jurisdiction to conform Texas law to a supervening decision of
the United States Supreme Court.68 The court said that inherent judicial
power is "not derived from legislative grant or specific constitutional
provision, but from the very fact that the court has been created and
65. See Government Servs. Ins. Underwriters v. Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. 1963); see
also 1 ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, supra note 34, at 99 (observing that "the Texas Constitution has
always been interpreted to authorize the legislature to do anything neither it nor the United StateS
Constitution forbids").
66. See generally 1 ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, supra note 34, at 99-100 (noting that state
constitutions are limiting instruments and that the Texas Constitution contains many express
limitations).
67. 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979).




charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities. ' 69
The court found authorization for inherent powers in the separation-of-
powers doctrine and defined them as "those which it may call upon to
aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and
in the preservation of its independence and integrity. ' 70 Earlier cases
had, for example, found inherent power to alter judgments, to call wit-
nesses, and to regulate the practice of law.71
The Eichelberger court declined, however, to rely upon inherent
power. It held that its constitutional power to review questions of law
decided by the lower courts provided adequate implied power to reverse
the judgment.72 The court stated unhelpfully that implied powers are
those that "can and ought to be implied from an express grant of
power."' 73 So defined, implied powers are little different from inherent or
plenary ones. Courts can discover somewhere whatever powers they
deem essential. Indeed, Texas courts have even claimed the power to
force adequate funding from local legislatures.74
Separation-of-powers analysis, however, is always a two-edged
sword. As Echelberger demonstrates, any constitutional grant of au-
thority to the courts or the executive may justify either direct action by
the recipient branch or at least statutory authorization to act. But, at the
same time, the grant can restrict both the recipient branch and the legis-
lature if it is read to limit the power it confers. 75
Alone among the branches, the executive lacks inherent powers.76
Agencies must be able to point to identifiable constitutional or statutory
authority for their actions.77 Moreover, the legislature has an affirmative
69. Id. at 398.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 398 n.1 (citing, inter alia, A.F. Jones & Sons v. Republic Supply Co., 151 Tex. 90,
246 S.W.2d 853 (1952) (power to set aside or otherwise control judgments); Burttschell v. Sheppard,
123 Tex. 113, 69 S.W.2d 402 (1934) (power to summon and compel the attendance of witnesses);
Scott v. State, 86 Tex. 321, 24 S.W. 789 (1894) (power to regulate the practice of law)).
72. Id. at 400.
73. Id. at 399.
74. See, eg., Vondy v. Commissioners Court, 620 S.W.2d 104, 109-10 (Tex. 1981) (holding that
inherent power allowed courts to mandamus commissioners to provide salary for court constables);
see also District Judges of the 188th Judicial Dist. v. County Judge, 657 S.W.2d 908, 909 (rex.
App.-Texarkana 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining that the judiciary, being entirely dependent
upon the other two branches for its funding and enforcement of its decrees, is especially vulnerable
to a breakdown of cooperation among the branches of government and therefore holds the inherent
power to insure itself the means to discharge its responsibilities). Courts in other states also claim
this power. See C. BAAR, SEPARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 143-61 (1975).
75. See, e.g., In re House Bill No. 537 of the Thirty-Eighth Legislature, 113 Tex. 367, 369, 256
S.W. 573, 574 (1923) (holding that the Texas Legislature may not expand constitutional jurisdiction
of the Texas Supreme Court).




duty to place limits on the power it confers on the executive. In Texas, as
elsewhere, the delegation doctrine theoretically requires that the legisla-
ture state policy standards when it empowers agencies.78 I say "theoreti-
cally" because all administrative lawyers know that the delegation
doctrine is honored mostly in the breach. Courts often uphold broad and
even meaningless standards on the pretense that these standards confine
administrative discretion.
79
Still, in state administrative law, courts occasionally invoke the dele-
gation doctrine to invalidate statutes.8 0 The doctrine has greater vigor at
the state level, perhaps reflecting differences between federal and state
agencies:
[f]ederal agency action usually involves full-time officials whose
only occupation is to implement the governmental program. Also,
with few exceptions, federal agencies are not designed to accommo-
date the direct representation of affected interest groups. By con-
trast, many state boards, such as occupational licensing boards,
commonly are drawn entirely from the interested group. Even
when no such interest representation is directly involved, wide-
spread reliance on part-time, volunteer "citizen boards" inevitably
raises problems of conflict of interest, disqualification, ex parte
communications, and action based on personal knowledge outside
a hearing record.81
Thus, the delegation doctrine attempts to force the legislature to impose
substantive statutory controls on agencies, especially when an agency's
structure allows capture by special interests or just amateurish fumbling.
The prevailing judicial reluctance to invoke the doctrine to invalidate
statutes reflects the fact that its vigorous enforcement would threaten
separation-of-powers values by displacing the legislature's prerogative to
decide how much discretion is appropriate for a particular function. Un-
fortunately, the overall result is often the very one that the doctrine at-
tempts to avoid: the legislature delegates broad powers to agencies, and
the courts faithfully interpret the statutes to confer wide discretion.
8 2
When this occurs, an agency may possess something approaching ple-
nary or inherent powers (although ultimately at the grace of both the
78. See id. at 92.
79. See, ag., Martinez v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 476 S.W.2d 400, 403-04 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying a statute making a doctor's license revocable for
"grossly unprofessional or dishonorable conduct"), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Jordan
v. State Bd. of Ins., 160 Tex. 506, 509-12, 334 S.W.2d 278, 280-82 (1960) (applying a statute requir-
ing that officers of a proposed company be "worthy of the public confidence").
80. See Texas Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas County Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924,
931 Crex. 1977) (invalidating the committee's authority to protect buildings of "historical interest").
81. Brodie & Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of Re-
view, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 540 (footnote omitted).




legislature and the courts). In such cases, whether the agency is subject
to meaningfil legal control depends mostly on judicial review of particu-
lar agency rules and decisions.
E. The Perils of Formalism
Because the Texas Constitution has been constantly amended, but
not reformulated since 1876, it is a disorganized patchwork that chal-
lenges any interpreter. Traps for the unwary and opportunities for the
enterprising abound. The explicit separation-of-powers command in arti-
cle II, section 1 creates a constant possibility that Texas courts will inval-
idate some legislative attempt to define the powers of a governmental
body. Given the text of section 1, a formalist approach allocating certain
powers to one branch and discovering their exercise by another is suffi-
cient to find a transgression. At the same time, section 1 contemplates
the existence of express constitutional exceptions to its command.
Therefore, under the same formalist approach, any reference to a govern-
mental body or function elsewhere in the constitution, whatever the tech-
nical reasons for the reference, can be elevated to a separation-of-powers
exception. s3 The danger of the formalist approach is that the interpreter
may read the constitution woodenly, losing sight of the purposes of sepa-
rated powers-to prevent arbitrary and inefficient government. The
more flexible functional approach, which emphasizes the purposes of
separated powers and asks whether core functions are threatened, better
fits the complexity of state government.
Three recent decisions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, all
of which invalidated statutes for contravening article II, section 1, amply
demonstrate the ,perils of formalism. In Williams v. State,s4 the court
confronted an apparent legislative mistake. The legislature had enacted
two provisions concerning remittitur of forfeited bail bonds in the same
bill.8 5 One of the provisions gave the district court discretion to remit all
or any portion of a bond before entering final judgment against it if the
defendant's appearance was voluntary or a result of the surety's action.8 6
The other provision entitled the surety to a ninety-five percent remittitur
if the defendant appeared within two years after a judgment and the
83. See, eg., Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 513, 186 S.W.2d 961, 964 (1945) (holding that
article XVI, § 59 of the Texas Constitution, which authorizes the legislature to conserve natural
resources through the creation and bonding of water conservation districts, also provides an excep-
tion to article II, § 1, sufficient to justify the Railroad Commission's performance of adjudicative
functions).
84. 707 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
85. Id. at 42-43; see also Tex. S.B. 727, 67th. Leg., ch. 312, §§ 1, 4 (1981).
86. See Williams, 707 S.W.2d at 42-43.
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surety claimed responsibility for the return. 87 The court noted the per-
verse incentive that the combination created: why would a surety risk
the court's discretion by seeking a defendant before judgment when wait-
ing until after entry of a judgment would entitle the surety to an auto-
matic ninety-five percent recovery? The court, however, declined to
invalidate the statute for lack of wisdom (lest the statute books be
empty). 88 Instead, the court concluded that the automatic remittitur in-
vaded judicial power by requiring the modification of a final judgment.8 9
The Williams court noted that the constitution vests the judicial
power in the courts and gives them jurisdiction over suits to recover for-
feitures. 90 The court then conceded that the legislature may affect the
exercise of this jurisdiction in various ways, as by mandating procedures
and penalties. 91 However, this statute "usurped" a judicial function by
altering a final judgment. 92 The court did not explain why the legislature
may not make a judgment conditional-at least prospectively. 93 Nor did
it explain how the statute deprived the courts of the necessary discretion
to perform their constitutional function.
In Meshell v. State,94 the court invalidated the Texas Speedy Trial
Act 95 for invading prosecutorial discretion during trial preparation.
96
The court began by noting that county and district attorneys are officers
of the judicial branch because article V creates them, although they
would be members of the executive branch under traditional separation-
of-powers theory. 97 In any event, the court conceded that local attorneys
derive their prosecutorial duties from the statutes, not from the constitu-
tion. 98 Despite the legislature's explicit constitutional authority to enact
87. See id.
88. See id. at 44-45.
89. Id. at 47.
90. See id. at 45 (construing TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 8).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 45-46.
93. The court relied on Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S.W.2d 1025 (1934), which forbids
legislative modification of preexisting deficiency judgments. See Williams, 707 S.W.2d at 46. The
Williams court thought that Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1974) had "no bearing,"
although it upheld a statute allowing 50% remittitur of amounts paid in prior bail bond forfeitures.
Williams, 707 S.W.2d at 46.
94. 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
95. Present version codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 (Vernon 1989).
96. See Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 255-57.
97. See id. at 253 & n.9. For a discussion of the traditional placement of prosecutors in the
executive, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 703-34 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, a line
of separation-of-powers cases considers the legislature's power to allocate responsibility between the
attorney general, an executive officer who represents the state in the Supreme Court, and these local
attorneys, who represent the state in the inferior courts. See Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 253-54. Thus,
some detailed constitutional provisions that seem designed for housekeeping assume the status of a
mandatory organization chart for government.




rules of procedure, the court concluded that the legislature could not
abridge their prosecutorial discretion once it vested the responsibility to
prosecute in these officers.99 The court's real objection appeared to be
the statute's inflexibility. For example, the Act did not allow considera-
tion of either the prosecutor's culpability or the defendant's injury. 1°°
Perhaps, then, the statute's restriction of prosecutorial discretion was ar-
bitrary or excessive. Nevertheless, the court's broad categorical ap-
proach placed unnecessary obstacles in the way of statutory controls on
prosecution.
Finally, in Rose v. State,10 1 the court held that a statute requiring
jury instructions regarding the effects of parole infringed the exclusive
executive power of clemency possessed by the governor and the Board of
Pardons and Paroles. 102 The court revealed its real objection to the stat-
ute, however, by referring to its own repeated efforts to stop juries from
speculating about parole.' 0 3 Perhaps the required instruction was mis-
leading, 104 but in light of the persistence of jury consideration of the is-
sue, the court had no justification for taking a broad separation-of-
powers position that would disable the legislature from addressing the
problem.
The court's rigid formalistic approach in these three cases focused
on characterization of government functions rather than on actual injury
to the operations of the supposedly aggrieved branch. Williams did not
explain how automatic bail remittiturs would interfere with essential ju-
dicial discretion. Meshell did not rely on any finding that the deadlines
in the Speedy Trial Act would interfere with effective prosecutorial prep-
aration for trial. And Rose did not explain how jury knowledge of parole
would hamper the executive's clemency powers. Perhaps these showings
could have been made, but if they are not a requisite, many statutes that
organize the state government are at risk.
F The Advantages of a Functional Approach
Texas courts have also taken a more flexible, functional approach to
separation of powers. In State Board of Insurance v. Betts,10 5 the Texas
99. See id. at 254-58.
100. See id. at 256.
101. 752 S.W.2d 529 (rex. Crim. App. 1987).
102. Id. at 535 (holding that the statute violated TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1). In Ex parte Giles,
502 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), the court had invalidated on similar grounds a statute
allowing a defendant whose sentence was on appeal to elect resentencing under less severe penalty
provisions of the new statute. Id. at 780-8 1.
103. See Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 536.
104. The majority believed it was. See id. at 534 n.6.
105. 158 Tex. 83, 308 S.W.2d 846 (1958).
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Supreme Court considered the respective powers of the courts and the
executive in insurance receiverships. 106 A statute authorized the State
Board of Insurance to appoint a receiver and some assistants to liquidate
the assets of a company under judicial supervision.1 07 The Board had
appointed and fired a receiver's attorney, whereupon the district court
temporarily appointed a replacement attorney. When the replacement
resigned and the Board took no action, the district court reappointed the
original attorney.108 The Board claimed it had sole authority to appoint
•the attorney,109 but the district judge responded that placing appointive
power in the Board violated article II, section 1 because the liquidation
proceeding was judicial.' 10
The Texas Supreme Court said that "[i]t is only when the function-
ing of the judicial process in a field constitutionally committed to the
control of the courts is interfered with by the executive or legislative
branches that a constitutional problem arises."' The court credited the
legislative purpose of centralizing some features of insurance administra-
tion in an agency and found that executive appointment posed no facial
interference with judicial control of liquidation proceedings. 1 2 But the
court also thought that the district court might need to intervene-as it
had here. 113 Therefore, the court refused to find exclusive power over
the appointments in either branch and upheld the action of the district
judge. 114
Betts implicitly recognizes that insurance receivers and their attor-
neys aid the functioning of both the executive and judicial branches and
that it is unrealistic to think of them as wholly subject to the control of
one branch. The same could be said of the local prosecutors in Meshell,
who are judicial officers in Texas, executive officers in the federal govern-
ment, and servants of both branches everywhere. Yet it is difficult to
reconcile this reality .with the text of article II, section 1, which forbids
members of one branch from exercising any power belonging to another.
In the complex structure of state government, this statement can only
mean that certain core powers must be reserved to officers having the
special characteristics of the branch designed to discharge them. That is,
even if prosecutors are "judicial" officers, we would never allow them to
106. See id. at 89-95, 308 S.W.2d at 849-55.
107. See id. at 86-87, 308 S.W.2d at 849.
108. Id. at 92-93, 308 S.W.2d at 853.
109. See id. at 85, 308 S.W.2d at 849.
110. See id. at 86, 308 S.W.2d at 849.
111. Id. at 90, 308 S.W.2d at 851-52.
112. See id. at 88-90, 308 S.W.2d at 850-52.
113. See id. at 90, 308 S.W.2d at 852.




supervise criminal trials. Only officers with the traditional characteris-
tics of judges may do that.
Formalist approaches to separation of powers cannot work for agen-
cies and local governments below the level of state constitutional officers.
Formalism's limitations are evident in local Texas governments, which
typically lack the separation of powers of the state and federal govern-
ments. 115 Texas county government is a vivid example. The commis-
sioners court, presided over by the county judge, is not a court at all, but
a combined legislative and administrative body.1 6 Perhaps the fact that
the Texas Constitution creates or mentions many kinds of local govern-
ments provides the explicit exceptions to general principles that are con-
templated by the constitution. But most of these constitutional
provisions, such as those allowing taxing and bonding, are unrelated to
the separation of powers. The resulting mosaic, if approached formalisti-
cally, can yield unfortunate results. One example should suffice.
In Ruiz v. State,1 17 a court considered whether a justice of the peace
could also serve as a school teacher. As justice of the peace, Ruiz was
clearly a judicial officer.1 18 The issue was whether his position as a voca-
tional teacher made him also an executive officer.1 19 The court distin-
guished officers from employees by their policy-making responsibilities
and classified Ruiz as an employee. 120 Following Betts, the court held
that Ruiz's duties as a teacher did not interfere with his duties as justice
of the peace. 121 That is surely the relevant inquiry as well as the right
result.
A final example of the functional approach is the Texas Supreme
Court's recent decision in State v. Thomas,1 22 in which the court held
that the Texas Attorney General may intervene on behalf of consumer
state agencies in electric rate cases before the Public Utility Commis-
sion.12 3 The attorney general's constitutional authority includes appear-
115. See Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Government Law: A Reappraisal, 60 MINN. L. REV.
669, 672-73 (1976).
116. See J. MAY, supra note 14, at 346 (enumerating the powers of the county commissioners
court, including legislative and administrative responsibilities such as approving the budget and
overseeing the condition of county roads).
117. 540 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
118. See id. at 811.
119. See id.
120. See id.; see also Boyett v. Calvert, 467 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that a faculty or staff member of a state university is an "agent or appointee" of
the state), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
121. Ruiz, 540 S.W.2d at 811-12. The court also held that Ruiz was in compliance with TEx.
CONST. art. XVI, § 40, which forbids dual officeholding but excepts justices of the peace. Id. at 810-
11.
122. 766 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1989).
123. Id. at 219-20.
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ing in "the courts" to prevent corporations from exacting excessive
charges. 124 The court noted that the legislature had shifted rate proceed-
ings from the district courts to the agency, where the rate proceedings
were formal adjudications. 125 Since the statutory proliferation of agen-
cies occurred after the 1876 adoption of the Texas Constitution, the court
read the term "courts" in a "generic sense to refer to an adjudicative
forum." 126 The contrary literal reading would "mean that the legislature
had obliterated a constitutional grant of power merely by statutorily cre-
ating an agency to serve the same function as courts once did in adjudi-
cating such disputes." 127 Thus, the court treated the evident purpose of
the attorney general's power as a guide to modern limits of that power.
As the next section demonstrates, the practice of allocating adjudicative
power to agencies has broad constitutional implications.
III. Judicial Review of Administrative Action
The legitimacy of agency action in state government depends on the
nature of judicial review, because legislative and executive oversight are
often attenuated.1 28 Moreover, only the courts routinely address the crit-
ical issue of the fidelity of administrative action to existing statutory and
constitutional requirements. Oversight by the two "political" branches
is, as it should be, mostly devoted to the desirability of altering current
statutes, funding, personnel, or policies.
Both statute129 and the separation-of-powers doctrine define judicial
review. The latter has produced a rich jurisprudence in Texas. This Part
first analyzes the legislature's power to allocate adjudicative authority to
agencies and to define the stringency of subsequent judicial review. It
then examines a doctrine that limits review in the absence of statutory
authority and suggests the need and justification for abandoning it. 130
A. Agency Adjudication and the Limits of Judicial Review
At the federal level, two insights reconcile agency adjudication with
separation-of-powers principles. First, courts can retain ultimate control
through limited judicial review.13 1 Second, agency adjudication often




128. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
129. See, eg., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (prescribing
the procedure for and scope of judicial review).
130. See infra subpart III(B).
131. See generally Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 111, 101




functions as policy making132 and therefore partakes of executive action.
Texas courts have come to the same general conclusions by a circuitous
route that owes much to legislative action.
133
In an era before the proliferation of agencies, Texas courts adopted a
simple and understandable initial approach: agencies could not exercise
judicial power. Thus, in Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight,134 the
Texas Supreme Court did not allow the Board to determine water rights
in the Pecos River. 135 The court, however, found ways to allow some
agency adjudication. It characterized some government-conferred bene-
fits (such as liquor licenses) as privileges and not as rights. Agency adju-
dication was then proper because only "administrative" and not
"judicial" power was involved.in allocating the benefits.
136
The court also supported agency adjudication by canvassing the
Texas Constitution for references to governmental bodies or functions
that could be characterized as express exceptions authorized by article II,
section 1. Thus, in Corzelius v. Harrell,137 the court justified the Rail-
road Commission's control of natural gas production by an authorization
in article XVI, section 59138 to enact laws to conserve natural re-
sources.139 However plausible on its face, this holding tore section 59
from its context-it was adopted to allow the formation of flood control
districts. 4° Plainly, it was undesirable to strain so hard just to allow
federal adjudicator, it must provide for judicial review of at least some issues in a constitutional
court"). The principal case is Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), holding that Congress may
establish agencies to "'determine various matters... which from their nature do not require judicial
determination and yet are susceptible of it.'" Id. at 50 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438, 451 (1929)).
132. See, eg., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943) (holding that prohibitions of direc-
tors and officers from buying or selling stock of a company undergoing reorganization "presents
problems of policy for the judgment of Congress or of the body to which it has delegated power to
deal with the matter").
133. For an able discussion of the issues explored in this section, see Hamilton & Jewett, The
Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: Contested Cases and Judicial Review, 54 TEXAS L.
REv. 285 passim (1976).
134. 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301 (1921).
135. Id. at 97, 229 S.W. at 307.
136. See, eg., State v. DeSilva, 105 Tex. 95, 100, 145 S.W. 330, 333 (1912) (declaring that a
proceeding to revoke a liquor license was not an assertion of "judicial" power).
137. 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945).
138. "The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this State,... and the
preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby
declared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate
thereto." TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
139. Corzelius, 143 Tex. at 513, 186 S.W.2d at 964.
140. The resources specifically delineated in article XVI, § 59(a) all pertain to water, with the
single exception of "trees." Sections 59(b)-(f) detail the creation and funding of "conservation and
reclamation districts." TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 59(b)-(f). The interpretive commentary notes that
this amendment was originally inspired by citizen demand for flood control after the Texas floods of
1913 and 1914. See TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 59 interp. commentary (Vernon 1955).
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agencies to adjudicate. A more satisfactory general approach eventually
developed.
Here the legislature played a role. It often delegated adjudicative
power to agencies with accompanying rights to de novo reconsideration
in court. 141 In an era when agency procedures were often slipshod, legis-
lative distrust of their decisions was natural. And because agency deci-
sions were not binding, the courts were unlikely to find a misallocation of
judicial power. At the same time, however, duplicating the agency's ef-
forts resulted in obvious waste., Moreover, an emerging principle in fed-
eral and state administrative law was that a court should not substitute
its judgment for that of an executive agency. Accordingly, the prevailing
national standard for review of agency adjudication called for courts to
uphold orders supported by "substantial evidence" in the agency rec-
ord. 142 This standard had the advantages of deferring to agency discre-
tion, while requiring enough evidentiary support to find a basis in law.
As a fundamental accommodation of competing separation-of-powers
values, it remains a dominant principle in modem administrative law.
Texas courts initially adapted the substantial-evidence standard in a
unique way. They interpreted de novo review provisions to mean that
courts should assess the reasonableness of an agency's order on the basis
of a record compiled not by the agency, but in court.143 This "Texas
substantial-evidence" standard avoided the perils of unguided judicial
formulation of a discretionary order, on the one hand, and reliance on a
poorly developed agency record, on the other. T4
A constitutional collision soon occurred, however, as the Texas Leg-
islature confirmed its intention to require true de novo review by passing
new statutes regulating review of agency determinations. 14 The courts
responded by invalidating such provisions as unconstitutional attempts
to give them nonjudicial duties, 146 unless the matter involved "judicial"
action by the agency. 147 The courts had come full circle-from doubting
that agencies could adjudicate at all to requiring that judicial review be
limited.
Texas courts have defined the "judicial" actions for which de novo
review may be required as those focusing on past facts about particular
141. See Hamilton & Jewett, supra note 133, at 295-302.
142. See G. ROBINSON, supra note 45, at 152-54.
143. See Hamilton & Jewett, supra note 133, at 296-300.
144. See id. at 300.
145. See id. (citing TEx. Rnv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4548h, § 5 (Vernon 1976); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 31 (Vernon 1977)).
146. See Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 57-60, 326 S.W.2d 699, 713-14 (1959).





parties; "administrative" actions consider broader "legislative" issues of
fact and policy.1 48 Thus, de novo review is allowed only for matters that
could have been assigned to courts originally. This test blurs at the mar-
gin. For example, revocation of an occupational license may concern
both individual conduct and social policy about professional standards.
Nevertheless, no better test seems readily available. De novo review may
be wasteful, but it is hard to find reasons why the Texas Legislature may
not require it in these limited instances.1 49
The next development in Texas concerned review on the-agency's
record. In Gerst v. Nixon, 150 the Texas Supreme Court upheld a statute
providing for review of decisions by the Savings and Loan Commissioner
on the administrative record. 51 A decade later, APTRA upgraded
agency adjudicative procedures and provided for either substantial evi-
dence review on the agency's record or true de novo review, as particular
statutes might require.15 2 With better agency procedures, de novo review
became even more duplicative, and the problem of displacing administra-
tive discretion remained.
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Commission,
15 3
the Texas Supreme Court in a telephone rate proceeding confronted an
odd hybrid provision that called for de novo review of one issue (confis-
cation) and otherwise required a substantial-evidence review of the
agency's record.154 Holding that the mixture was "so inharmonious and
conflicting as to be impossible of execution," the court converted the
statute to pure substantial-evidence review.1 55 It emphasized the ineffi-
ciency of de novo review after APTRA and suggested that judicial hostil-
ity to these statutes will, if anything, intensify.
156
Today, most agency adjudication is reviewed on the administrative
148. See Scott v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 S.W.2d 686, 690-91 (Tex. 1964); Key
Western, 163 Tex. at 23-24, 350 S.W.2d at 847-48.
149. Federal courts dealing with similar issues concerning the allocation of adjudicative power
to agencies employ the notoriously conclusory "public rights" doctrine. See Bruff, Public Programs,
Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEXAS L. REa. 441,
468-77 (1989). Indeed, the Texas test parallels the one used to determine whether the due process
clauses of the federal constitution require agencies to provide adjudicative procedure. See G. ROBIN-
SON, supra note 45, at 36, 593. When due process demands adjudicative procedure, relatively intense
judicial review is appropriate. See id. at 150-52.
150. 411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1967).
151. Id. at 355-56.
152. See TEx. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art 6252-13a, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
153. 571 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1978).
154. See id. at 506.
155. Id. at 512.
156. See id. at 508-10.
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record, although islands of de novo review 157 and even "Texas substan-
tial-evidence review" continue to exist. 158 The lingering constitutional
issue is whether a particular statute makes judicial review too intrusive.
B. Unreviewable Administrative Action in Texas
Federal administrative law presumes that agency action is subject to
judicial review absent a showing of clear congressional intent to restrict
or deny it. 159 The effect is to make review widely available on a nonstat-
utory basis-that is, for suits that are not based on statutes specifically
authorizing review of administrative action, but on statutes authorizing
courts to issue declaratory judgments or the prerogative writs such as
mandamus.160 Indeed, a congressional decision to preclude all judicial
review of an agency action for which it is functionally appropriate might
violate due process.161
Texas employs the opposite presumption-that administrative ac-
tion is unreviewable unless there exists specific statutory authority. An
exception, responding to the due process concerns raised by the federal
cases, allows review if the action would infringe upon constitutional
rights or vested property rights. 162 Yet many actions remain
unreviewable.
In Motorola, Inc. v. Bullock,163 the company paid a tax bill of 97,000
dollars under protest and filed a refund claim with the Comptroller. He
denied it after a hearing, and the company appealed to the district court.
Motorola had not availed itself of a statutory right to sue for a refund
within ninety days of payment, presumably because it was exhausting its
administrative remedies. Yet no statute specifically authorized an appeal
from the Comptroller's hearing. The court of appeals, citing the general
157. See, eg., Bishop v. Martin, 740 S.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (requiring de novo review for the revocation of a day care license).
158. See, e.g., Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986) (applying the substantial evi-
dence test to a case that arose under a special statute for the Texas Employment Commission, which
is explicitly excluded from APTRA).
159. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
160. See G. ROBINSON, supra note 45, at 136-38.
161. See generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401-02 (1953) (discussing situations in which Con-
gress may regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts); Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limita-
tions on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17,
25 (1981) (same). Courts avoid the issue by reading preclusion statues to allow consideration of
some issues, such as constitutional ones. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974)
(holding that the question of the constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation was not within a
statute otherwise barring review).
162. See Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex. 1967).




Texas rule, ordered dismissal of the suit.164 The court did not consider
whether a constitutional or vested property right might be present,
although Motorola characterized the Comptroller's action as confisca-
tory. 165 Nor would the court read APTRA's provision defining judicial
review of contested cases as a grant of jurisdiction. 166 The court re-
garded APTRA as a purely procedural statute, although section 19(a)
states: "A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies avail-
able within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a con-
tested case is entitled to judicial review under this Act. This section is
cumulative of other means of redress provided by statute."
167
In City of Amarillo v. Hancock,1 68 Amarillo's Civil Service Commis-
sion, after a hearing, demoted a firefighter from captain to driver. He
appealed to the district court, which found no cause for demotion and
reinstated him. Because a statute provided for demotion procedures
before the Commission but did not provide for an appeal, the Texas
Supreme Court ordered the case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
1 69
The court cited the Texas rule, emphasizing that jurisdiction must rest
on constitutional or statutory grants except in cases raising the inherent
right to review an action threatening constitutional rights (including
vested property rights). 170 The court could find no property right in
Hancock's captaincy because the city was free to abolish the position at
any time.
171
Motorola and Hancock typify the Texas approach.1 72 Consequently,
definitions of the constitutional rights that justify unauthorized judicial
review are important. Common-law property rights such as mineral es-
tates provide some easy cases.173 Yet property rights take many forms
(arguably, Motorola's tax payment should qualify). Interests in the "new
164. Id. at 708.
165. See id. at 707-08.
166. See id. at 708-09.
167. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990). This provision is
drawn from § 15 of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961. See MODEL STATE
ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 15, 14 U.L.A. 429-30 (1980). The first sentence is a direct quotation of
the Model Act; the second is a paraphrase. The commentary to the Model Act does not address
whether the provision grants jurisdiction.
168. 150 Tex. 231, 239 S.W.2d 788 (1951).
169. Id. at 238, 239 S.W.2d at 792.
170. See id. at 234-35, 239 S.W.2d at 790-91.
171. See id. at 235, 239 S.W.2d at 791.
172. For another example, see Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Blanchard, 582
S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. 1979) (holding that disciplinary suspensions of police officers are
nonreviewable).
173. See, eg., Railroad Comm'n v. Graford Oil Corp., 557 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. 1977) (en-
joining the Railroad Commission from consolidating nine oil wells, holding that due process had
been denied and mandatory fact finding had not been accomplished).
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property" 174-government-conferred statuses or benefits, such as Han-
cock's captaincy-are even trickier. Since the 1970s, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the "property" protected by fed-
eral due process includes any form of the new property to which the
recipient has a legitimate claim of entitlement under state law. 175
If Motorola was entitled to a refund on certain grounds, 176 or if
Hancock could not be demoted without cause, 177 they possessed property
interests protected by federal due process. The federal cases ask the
question that modem Texas courts should address in their efforts to de-
fine vested property rights-whether state law provides mandatory crite-
ria for granting or withholding benefits conferred by government. Thus,
ii Martine v. Board of Regents,1 78 a Texas court of appeals relied on the
fqderal criteria for defining property in deciding that faculty tenure is a
vested property right that allows unauthorized judicial review of a
dismissal.
179
Yet, the underlying issues at the state and federal levels are differ-
ent. The federal due process cases do not directly govern Texas contro-
versies about judicial review. The federal cases focus on hearings that
agencies must provide rather than on subsequent judicial review. Both
Motorola and Hancock had hearings before agencies and complained not
about the process provided there but only about the outcome.
The federal criteria for defining property are pertinent to defining
rights to judicial review in Texas because, like agency hearings, judicial
review prevents arbitrary government decisions and should therefore be
available when state law creates entitlements to certain benefits. The fact
174. The term originated in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964).
175. See, eg., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (holding that
state law defines property rights that public employees may have in employment, while federal con-
stitutional law governs the adequacy of procedure); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972) (holding that absent a state statute or university policy securing an employee's interest in
employment, and absent debilitating stigmatization, the employee does not have a constitutionally
protected property interest); see also Tarrant County v. Ashmore, 635 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Tex.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982) (holding that the removal of justices and constables following a redis-
tricting order did not deprive them of property).
176. The issue was unclear: the statute said that the Comptroller "may refund" overpayments
due to mistake of fact or law. See Motorola, Inc. v. Bullock, 586 S.W.2d 706, 707-08 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Auatin 1979, no writ).
177. This appears to have been so. See City of Amarillo v. Hancock, 150 Tex. 231, 237, 239
S.W.2d 788, 792 (1951). However, it would be pertinent only under the modern definitions of prop-
erty, which were not formulated when Hancock was decided.
178. 578 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ), appeal after remand, 607 S.W.2d
638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
179. Id. at 470. On remand, the trial court set aside the Regents' order on the merits and or-
dered reinstatement of the plaintiff to his position as a tenured faculty member. The reinstatement
order was affirmed in Board of Regents v. Martine, 607 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin




that federal constitutional law does not clearly require judicial review
should not weigh against providing it as a matter of state constitutional
law because many state agencies receive little scrutiny from other
branches of government. Indeed, Texas cases have recognized various
forms of the new property for purposes of judicial review. Bank char-
ters180 and occupational advertising permits181 are examples.
Nevertheless, gaps remain where judicial review may be denied, de-
spite the existence of an important interest that should not be treated
arbitrarily. Motorola's money and Hancock's captaincy are examples.
In any event, statutory review has long been extended to many interests
that were not thought to be of constitutional stature. When review is not
provided and no clear constitutional right is at stake, what should courts
do?
The Texas Supreme Court provided an answer in dictum in Fire
Department v. City of Fort Worth :182 "[i]t is generally recognized that
even without express statutory authorization the orders entered by an
administrative body pursuant to legislative sanction are subject to judi-
cial review." 18 3 This statement was unnecessary in a case challenging de
novo review. It was later implicitly disapproved because it rejects the
prevailing Texas rule. 184 Yet the court's reason for the dictum should be
persuasive -today: "[t]he exercise of this jurisdiction by the courts is not
in derogation of the separation of powers . . . but, on the contrary, is
calculated directly to uphold and preserve that principle."'81 5
Thus, Texas courts can justify a presumption in favor of judicial
review on separation-of-powers grounds. No wide-ranging judicial
claims of inherent or implied powers are necessary. Nor is it necessary to
state a principle that disables legislative control of the nature and availa-
bility of review. Instead, Texas courts should determine the availability
of judicial review by applying well-established federal and state adminis-
trative law concepts about the role of courts.
The Supreme Court's first encounter with judicial review of admin-
istrative action occurred in Marbury v. Madison.186 The importance of
Chief Justice Marshall's assertion of the power to invalidate unconstitu-
180. See Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex. 1963); Brazosport
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 161 Tex. 543, 551, 342 S.W.2d 747, 752 (1961).
181. See Texas Optometry Bd. v. Lee Vision Center, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
182. 147 Tex. 505, 217 S.W.2d 664 (1949).
183. Id. at 509, 217 S.W.2d at 666.
184. See Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Kennedy, 514 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex.
1974).
185. Fire Department, 147 Tex. at 509, 217 S.W.2d at 666.
186. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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tional statutes often obscures his opinion's fundamental contribution to
administrative law. 18  Marbury sought mandamus compelling a high ex-
ecutive officer, the Secretary of State, to deliver his commission. Mar-
shall's opinion set the foundation for judicial review of administrative
action in the United States by stating that a court could grant mandamus
against a high executive officer without invading the prerogatives of a
coordinate branch.
American courts still employ the sources and limits of judicial
power that Marshall identified in Marbury. The statute in question sim-
ply authorized the Supreme Court to issue mandamus "in cases war-
ranted by the principles and usages of law."188 Marshall therefore drew
his definition of the role of mandamus directly from common-law
sources such as Blackstone. These sources convinced him that courts
could force even high executive officers to comply with legal duties. But
mandamus could not intrude on discretionary, "political" duties.
189
Marshall concluded that delivery of the commission to Marbury was a
ministerial action that any court with jurisdiction could compel.' 90
Marbury adapted a common-law power of the English courts to our
scheme of separated powers. The framers of the various Texas constitu-
tions surely understood and accepted Marbury's essential premises.1 91
Thus, the "judicial power" that the Texas Constitution vests in the
courts 92 should include a power that has existed throughout our nation's
history, namely, the power to conform executive action to law. Simi-
larly, Texas's separation-of-powers provision commands the courts to
play their traditional, proper role in checking executive activity. Such
interpretations have a far better claim to historical legitimacy than does
the current Texas presumption against judicial review.
Finding an inherent judicial power to control executive action also
fits modem separation-of-powers theory. Federal courts have reconciled
shifting vast amounts of power to agencies, power that could have been
placed in the courts' hands, by emphasizing the need to retain the check
187. See generally Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1
passim (1983) (arguing that Marbury's "prominence as a constitutional decision has long deflected
interest in examining its other implications," particularly with respect to the scope of judicial review
of administrative action).
188. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 173.
189. See id. at 170-71.
190. See id. at 173. Of course, the Court's holding was that Congress could not constitutionally
expand the Court's original jurisdiction, so the authority to grant mandamus was invalid. Id. at 176-
80.
191. In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 538 (1838), the Supreme
Court confirmed Marbury's dicta that mandamus could issue against executive officers-almost four
decades prior to the current Texas Constitution.




of judicial review.193 Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court's insight in
Thomas, that legislative creation of large numbers of agencies should not
displace fundamental constitutional grants of power, 194 supports a pre-
sumption in favor of judicial review.
Methods for obtaining nonstatutory review in Texas should be rela-
tively simple; they are the methods used in other jurisdictions. The dis-
trict courts have statutory power to issue mandamus and injunctions.1 95
The district courts also have explicit authority under the Declaratory
Judgments Act to construe statutes and declare the rights created by
statute. 196 Texas courts have used these remedies to provide relief when
constitutional rights have been implicated. 197 To permit nonstatutory re-
view in Texas, the courts need only extend the remedies they already
possess to claims that agencies are acting contrary to law.
If separation-of-powers principles fail to create a presumption favor-
ing judicial review, either of two provisions in our bill of rights should
suffice. 198 First, article I, section 13 provides: "All courts shall be open,
and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."'199 Second, a sepa-
rate due prodess guarantee in article I, section 19 provides: "No citizen
of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or im-
munities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the
law of the land. ' '20
°
In an effort to avoid treating any constitutional text as surplusage
(and perhaps to pay homage to emphasis), Texas courts do not treat
193. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
195. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.011 (Vernon 1988); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 65.011, 65.021 (Vernon 1986). The district courts had explicit constitutional power to issue
mandamus and injunctions until recently. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (1891, amended 1985). A
simplifying amendment in 1985 gave the district courts all original jurisdiction not allocated else-
where by law and affirmed the power of district courts to issue writs that are necessary to enforce
their jurisdiction. See id. The Texas Supreme Court has constitutional power to issue mandamus,
see TEx. CONST. art. V, § 3, which is exclusive in some cases involving "officers of the executive
departments." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(c) (Vernon 1988).
196. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004 (Vernon 1986).
197. See, eg., Duckett v. City of Houston, 495 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Tex. 1973) (affirming district
court's issuance of mandamus compelling city officials to fill a vacant civil service position in compli-
ance with Fireman's and Policeman's Civil Service Law); cf Spring Branch Indep. School Dist. v.
Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 562 (Tex. 1985) (reversing the trial court's finding of unconstitutionality as
to TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.920(b) (Vernon 1972), but noting that arbitrary exercise of a school
principal's discretion under the section could give rise to an equal-protection claim), appeal dis-
missed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
198. For the background of the Texas Bill of Rights, see Ponton, Sources of Liberty in the Texas
Bill of Rights, 20 ST. MARY's L.J. 93, 112-14 (1988); see also Ericson, Origins of the Texas Bill of
Rights, 62 Sw. HIST. Q. 457 passim (1959).
199. TEX. CONT. art. I, § 13.
200. Id. § 19.
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these provisions as coterminous.20 Instead, they pursue several distinct
inquiries. First, federal or state procedural due process may require
agencies to provide hearings. 20 2 The two similarly phrased Texas due
process guarantees have lived in the shadow of the fourteenth amend-
ment-Texas courts have generally conformed them to federal
precedents.
203
The interests protected by the Texas due-course-of-law provisions,
however, are more broadly phrased than those protected by the federal
counterpart; the federal provision refers only to life, liberty, and prop-
erty. Surely this comparative breadth justifies an approach like that of
the federal cases, recognizing all government-conferred statuses and ben-
efits governed by mandatory criteria as interests entitled to due course of
law. When the availability of judicial review is at issue, Texas courts
could also follow the federal presumption, based on due process, that
review is available unless a statute clearly precludes it.
Second, Texas courts follow an active substantive due process doc-
trine that has invalidated a number of statutes for unreasonably interfer-
ing with common-law causes of action. Restrictions on medical
malpractice actions are examples. 2°4 Courts that are willing to protect
common-law causes of action against statutory modification should also
be willing to protect common-law remedies in administrative law in the
absence of statutory limits.
Finally, the open-courts clause of article I, section 13205 has received
independent emphasis as a right of access to the courts.20 6 The major
modern case relying on this provision is LeCroy v. Hanlon,20 7 which in-
validated an increase in court-filing fees aimed at increasing general reve-
nue rather than supporting the courts. 20 8 The court stressed the presence
of an open-courts provision in every Texas constitution and cited with
201. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1984).
202. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
203. See Harrington, The Texas Bill of Rights and Civil Liberties, 17 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1487,
1523-28 (1986).
204. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (rex. 1988) (invalidating a statute
that limited medical malpractice damages to $500,000); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922
(Tex. 1984) (invalidating a statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims because it cut off a
cause of action before the party knew he was injured); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (rex.
1983) (invalidating a statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims dealing with minors).
205. Article 1, § 13 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEx.
CONsT. art. I, § 13.
206. For example, an appeal bond requirement fell because it was not conditioned on ability to
pay. See Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1, 4, 14 S.W. 303, 305 (1890).
207. 713 S.W.2d 335 (rex. 1986).




approval a series of early cases that invoked the provision to cure gaps in
statutory grants of jurisdiction-such as assignments of jurisdiction to
counties that had not been organized.20 9 Although the LeCroy court an-
nounced a balancing test by which only unreasonable interference with
access to the courts would be unconstitutional, 210 its invalidation of a
forty dollar increase in fees effectively adopted a general rule against
taxes on the right to litigate.
LeCroy's obvious solicitude for litigants' "right to their day in
court"2 11 should be extended to the administrative context, where a pre-
sumption favoring judicial review does not require the invalidation of any
statutes. Moreover, as LeCroy recognized, Texas courts have long used
the open-courts provision to justify filling gaps in their jurisdiction not
reflective of considered legislative policy to deny common-law remedies.
Ever since Marbury sued for his commission, judicial review of ad-
ministrative action has provided American litigants an important day in
court. Judicial review of administrative action also enforces separation-
of-powers controls on executive action for everyone's benefit. It is time
for Texas to recognize that right.
209. See id. at 340.
210. See id. at 341.
211. Id.
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